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Almost eight years after the Expert Panel on Recognising Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in the Australian Constitution was 
established, institutional reform to empower Indigenous peoples in this 
country has not been realised. This article argues that the persistent 
failure to progress constitutional reform stems, in part, from dominant 
conceptions of Australian citizenship that deny Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoplehood. It follows that meaningful institutional 
reform is possible only if Australian citizenship is reconceptualised in 
a manner that makes room for the distinctive status of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples. Treaties offer a path forward to develop 
this new understanding of Australian identity and ground institutional 
reform.  
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Australia has long debated constitutional reform to protect and empower Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people. In recent years, that debate has been reinvigorated by a series of parliamentary and 
expert bodies designed to raise awareness of the need for change, propose options for that change, and 
build a community consensus around those proposals. Conducted under the auspices of ‘recognising’ 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in the Australian Constitution, a significant focus of this 
debate has been on institutional change. Proposals for institutional change have included both ‘big-C’ 
constitutional reforms relating to the text of the Australian Constitution, and ‘small-C’ constitutional 
change concerning the norms, customs, and traditions governing the exercise and distribution of public 
power within Australia (Lino 2016, 6). In large part, the focus on institutional change is understandable. 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander motivation for reform rests on their desire that any reform 
‘empower our people [to] take a rightful place in our own country’ (Referendum Council 2017, i, 
emphasis in original). As Australia’s existing constitutional and political framework disempowers 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, reform of those institutions is the primary vehicle through 
which their aspirations may be realised. 
 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander aspirations for reform are, of course, not limited to institutional 
change. The First Nations of Australia have long identified a ‘culture of disrespect’ (Davis 2006) that 
permeates Indigenous-state relations. This culture constructs a ‘wall of indifference’ (Colbung 1975, 
28) that discounts Indigenous values and worldviews and results in legislation and policy that operates 
to deny Indigenous rights (Dodson and Cronin 2011, 189). As such, attitudinal and relational shifts are 
a high priority. In the Uluru Statement from the Heart, for example, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples called for a Makarrata Commission to supervise a process of truth telling and agreement making, 
both extra-institutional reforms. These calls echo previous proposals for treaty and sit neatly within a 
more broadly conceived goal of reconciliation. Nonetheless, while institutional change is not the only 
type of reform desired, it remains a primary goal, for, as Larissa Behrendt has argued, ‘the institutional 
form given to the recognition of Indigenous rights and democratic ideals’ (2003, 16) shapes societal and 
cultural attitudes. For many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people then, institutional change 




Eight years after the establishment of the Expert Panel on Recognising Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Peoples in the Constitution, however, institutional reform has not been achieved. Despite polls 
indicating considerable support for constitutional change throughout the Australian public, a broad 
consensus within the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community on specific proposals, and the 
support of government-initiated expert bodies, constitutional change appears distant. Several reasons 
have been identified for this failure, ranging from the difficulty of securing constitutional reform through 
s 128 of the Constitution, philosophical dispute over rights protection, and politicians wary of expending 
political capital or even reading reports they have commissioned (Davis in Fitzpatrick 2017). There is 
no one reason why institutional change has not succeeded; each has merit. In this article, I propose 
another reason why constitutional reform has proven so difficult: prevailing conceptions of Australian 
citizenship do not permit such institutional change.  
 
Meaningful structural reform to the politico-legal framework of Australian governance is, in part, 
normatively based on Indigenous peoplehood. While Australian citizenship is broader and more 
inclusive than it historically has been, it is still often conflated with a ‘dominant idea of a culturally 
homogenous nation’ (Pitty 2009, 29). This understanding is marshalled to promote a false dichotomy 
between equality and difference that operates to deny the peoplehood status of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islanders (Dodson 1997, 59; Rowse 2000, 86). Constitutional reform that establishes institutional 
structures to express Indigenous peoplehood is therefore unlikely unless Australian citizenship is 
reconceptualised (Peterson and Sanders 1998, 26). A substantively inclusive Australian citizenship 
would recognise and accommodate both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoplehood, laying the 
foundation for institutional reform to empower Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and enable 
them to take a rightful place in our shared country.  
 
This article commences the project of developing and articulating a truly inclusive Australian 
citizenship. It begins by exploring how existing understandings are predicated on a culturally 
homogenous nation that denies differentiated rights. It then sketches a citizenship built on the fact of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoplehood. In a final section, it identifies treaty as a means to 
both ground this new understanding of Australian citizenship and develop institutional mechanisms to 
articulate this distinct status.  
 
II. CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY 
 
Citizenship has both legal and normative dimensions. In its former connotations, citizenship refers to 
the legal status of an individual and differentiates between classes of persons on the basis of this status. 
As a normative concept, however, citizenship is broader and is often associated with questions of 
belonging and social membership, irrespective of legal categorisations (Rubenstein 2000, 578). Of 
course, legal and normative dimensions of citizenship interact and intersect, shaping the content and 
contours of each other. In this Part, I explore understandings of Australian citizenship as it relates to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, tracing its history from colonial origins to the modern 
day. As legal exclusions have been chipped away, Australian citizenship has become a broad and 
inclusive notion, predicated on individual equality and flexible enough to encompass Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people. This broad conception of the Australian political community secures 
important democratic goals, ensuing that ‘everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government 
[has the] right to participate in that government’ (Dahl 1970, 49). And yet, the terms of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander inclusion into the Australian community are problematic. Australian citizenship 
is often articulated in an exclusionary manner, emphasising formal individual equality that conflicts with 
Indigenous peoplehood (Archer 1997; see also generally Levy 2012). If lasting reform to Australia’s 
political and legal governance framework is to be realised, this understanding of Australian citizenship 
must be reconceived to make room for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander nationhood as co-sovereigns 
on and of this land.   
 




In both their legal and normative dimensions, rules governing membership of the Australian community 
have become more inclusive over time. Colonial governments initially considered Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples to be ‘living representatives of primitive man’, and expected that they ‘would be 
exterminated by the progress of civilisation’ (McGregor 1997, 14-22). This was understood as a two-
stage process: ‘people of full descent would soon “die out”’ and Aboriginality ‘would disappear 
altogether through biological absorption’ (Ellinghaus 2003, 186). The ‘dying race’ (Rowley 1970, 124) 
theory became ‘so embedded in the belief system of whites’ that it ‘contributed significantly to the 
pervasive ideologies that formed the racist, protectionist policies framed by’ colonial governments 
(Holland 2013). Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were thus excluded from the Australian 
state, and played no meaningful role in the drafting of the Constitution (Williams 2000, 648), which 
expressly discriminated against them (Constitution of Australia, ss 25, 51(xxvi), 127). At 1901 then, 
Australian democracy was conditioned on the removal of Indigenous peoples, and the Australian 
community was conceived as British and white (Arcioni 2015, 175).  
 
Recognising that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were not dying out, government policy 
shifted in the 1930s towards assimilation (Chesterman and Douglas 2004, 48). These new policies 
recognised that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples were excluded from, and conceptually 
placed outside the Australian polity, and consequently sought to rectify this injustice via inclusion. As 
Paul Hasluck, the Aboriginal Affairs Minister explained in a 1963 policy statement, however, 
‘inclusion’ was to be unidirectional; the identity of the Australian political community was not expected 
to change: 
 
The policy of assimilation means that all Aborigines and part-Aborigines will attain the 
same manner of living as other Australians and live as members of a single Australian 
community enjoying the same rights and privileges, accepting the same responsibilities, 
observing the same customs and influenced by the same beliefs, hopes and loyalties as 
other Australians (1988, 93). 
 
Debate persists as to whether this shift in policy is responsible for the extension of the franchise to all 
Indigenous peoples at the Commonwealth level in 1962, but it is undeniable that ‘a certain philosophical 
consistency’ exists between enfranchisement and assimilation (Chesterman 2005, 18; Goot 2006). 
Indeed, in introducing the legislation extending the franchise, the Minister for the Interior, Gordon 
Freeth, expressed hope that it would ‘proclaim to the world that…the Aboriginal people of Australia 
enjoy complete political equality with the rest of the [white Australian] community’ (Hansard 1962, 
861), while Hasluck lauded its passage as ‘one step further towards the ideal of one people in one 
continent’ (Hansard 1962, 1771).  
 
The excision of s 127 and alteration of s 51(xxvi) in the 1967 referendum both reflected and contributed 
to the broadening of Australian citizenship and identity. Section 127 did not legally exclude Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islanders from being counted as citizens, but it excluded them from ‘membership of 
the constitutional community’ (Arcioni 2014, 17-18). Similarly, while the states could make laws for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, alteration of s 51(xxvi) empowered the Commonwealth to 
do so on the same basis as all other ‘races’. The referendum result thus symbolically and practically 
expanded the idea of Australian identity by making room for First Nations. That inclusion was however, 
very much on the terms of the settler-state. The absence of any explicit recognition of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander normative distinctiveness recorded their citizenship in neutral terms (Pearson 
2011).  
 
The gradual inclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people into the Australian community 
has brought many positives. As citizens, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders today possess a broad 
and equal distribution of the formal political resources. At least since 1983, when compulsory voting 
was extended to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, they have enjoyed ‘full equality’ in the 
electoral arena (Sawer and Brent 2011, 21) as Australian citizenship has come to denote membership of 
a ‘single-status community’ (Nootens 2013, 58). On the same basis as non-Indigenous citizens, 
Indigenous Australians may stand for Parliament, freely discuss political and governmental matters, and 
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assemble and associate for that purpose. Undifferentiated citizenship rights also serve important 
unifying goals, ensuring that citizenship is understood as ‘a common bond, involving reciprocal rights 
and obligations’ (Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), preamble). While we may have cultural, ethnic, 
or other group affiliations, as Australian citizens we are encouraged to transcend these particularities 
and ‘to think and act as a member of a [single] political community’ (Parekh 2000, 181). 
 
At a Federation Conference Banquet in 1890, Henry Parkes, the ‘Father of Federation’, characterised 
the relationship of the peoples of the colonies as bound together by a ‘crimson thread of kinship’ (Cole 
1971). Invocations of blood may no longer feature in mainstream accounts of Australian identity, but 
the modern emphasis on undifferentiated citizenship rights is nonetheless problematic for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islanders as it serves to deny their status as distinct peoples. The challenge for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people is that their claims go beyond ‘shared civil, political and 
social rights of citizens’ and encompass ‘demands for land rights, cultural protections, reparations and 
forms of collective autonomy’ (Lino 2017, 120). These aspirations connect to broader global debates 
over the ‘politics of recognition’, whereby marginalised groups contest that public institutions and 
politico-legal frameworks fail to give due regard to their distinctiveness (Taylor in Gutmann 1994; 
Fraser and Honneth 2003). In the case of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, their claims are 
embedded in and drawn from long histories as self-governing communities operating under their own 
source of laws prior to colonisation. When citizenship is understood as membership of a single-status 
community, these claims cannot be heard.  
 
Recognition as ‘peoples’ at international law was finally realised in 2007 with the adoption of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Indigenous delegates were directly 
and actively involved in drafting the Declaration, and while it reflects tensions within Indigenous polities 
and between Indigenous political communities and states, its norms ‘substantially reflect Indigenous 
peoples’ own aspirations’ (Anaya 2010, 17). The UNDRIP affirms a multinational ordering of the state 
(Kymlicka 2011, 188), guaranteeing that Indigenous peoples have the right ‘to a nationality’ (UNDRIP, 
art 6) as well as the right to ‘belong to an Indigenous community or nation’ determined in accordance 
with the ‘traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned’ (UNDRIP, art 9). Recognition 
of the plurinational basis of states that house Indigenous peoples is also inherent to Article 33, which 
expressly guarantees that membership in an Indigenous nation ‘does not impair the right of Indigenous 
individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live’ (see also UNDRIP, arts 8(1)-(2), 36(1)). 
 
The Australian state has made some attempts to recognise a differentiated status. As Dylan Lino notes, 
recognition comes in three major forms: the establishment of distinct entitlements to land; protection of 
cultural heritage; and the emergence of an Indigenous sector to ‘represent, deliver services to and 
manage land for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ (Lino 2017, 121). Consistent with this 
conceptual shift, Australia endorsed the UNDRIP in 2009. These legislative advances and executive 
actions suggest that normative conceptions of Australian citizenship are broad enough to accommodate 
and recognise Indigenous peoplehood. These successes are, however, only partial; ‘the dominant 
institutions such as law and government, and their epistemologies, remain anglicised’ (Moreton-
Robinson 2017) and understandings of Australian identity continue to marginalise Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoplehood in favour of ‘the sameness that is at the core of the national identity’ 
(Davis 2016, 86 emphasis in original; Stokes 1997, 168). Indeed, Australia initially refused to adopt the 
UNDRIP, remarking that it could not accept an instrument that would ‘apply a standard for Indigenous 
peoples that does not apply to others in the population’ (Hill 2007, 11). 
 
The resistance to and eventual abolition of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
(ATSIC) reveals the importance of conceptualisations of citizenship to lasting structural reform in this 
country. Established in 1989, ATSIC was a nationally representative Indigenous body with considerable 
authority, enabling Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander representatives to identify funding priorities, 
formulate and implement regional plans, make decisions over public expenditure, protect cultural 
material and information, and speak directly to government (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission Act 1989 (Cth) s 7). As such, ATSIC served as an acknowledgment that public policy 
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affecting Indigenous peoples should not be devised and implemented by the Australian population as a 
whole but by those affected by it.  
 
The Commission therefore directly challenged the dominant conceptualisation of Australian citizenship, 
inviting virulent criticism. In debate on the ATSIC Bill, for instance, the Commission was condemned 
as a ‘black parliament’ (Hansard 1989, 395, 641, 1341), which ‘smacks of separatism of the worst 
possible kind in a nation’ (Hansard 1989, 2014) and its establishment denounced as inflicting ‘a 
monumental disservice to the Australian community’ striking ‘at the heart of the unity of the Australian 
people’ (Hansard 1989, 1328). This language periodically reappeared in debate over ATSIC throughout 
its life (see e.g. Johns 2003), and ultimately served as a justification for its eventual abolition in 2005. 
In announcing this decision, Prime Minister Howard declared that ‘the experiment in separate 
representation, elected representation, for Indigenous people has been a failure’ (2004). Amanda 
Vanstone, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (a portfolio that 
encapsulated the assimilative tendencies of the state) defended the decision in an address to the 
Bennelong Society later that year, remarking that, ‘for too long we have let ideological positions like 
self-determination prevent governments from engaging with their Indigenous citizens’ (2004, 4). For 
Vanstone, the Commission—and the very notion of Indigenous difference—demarcated Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people from other Australians in a manner incompatible with Australian 
citizenship. While real structural and governance problems beset the Commission (Sanders 2004), it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that an exclusionary form of Australian citizenship contributed to its 
demise.  
 
Similar attitudes are prevalent in the contemporary debate on constitutional recognition (Patrick 2016), 
suggesting that the dominant conceptualisation of Australian citizenship is a primary challenge for 
advocates of reform. A few examples will suffice. In 2016, Tony Abbott rejected growing calls for a 
treaty between First Nations and the Australian state, noting that: ‘A treaty is something that two nations 
make with each other, and obviously Aboriginal people are the first Australians, but in the end we’re all 
Australians together, so I don't support a treaty’ (McIlroy 2016). Likewise, in a research brief distributed 
to all parliamentarians following the release of the Referendum Council report, the Institute for Public 
Affairs set out four reasons to reject the Council’s recommendations, three of which implicitly rested on 
a conception of Australian citizenship that denied Indigenous peoplehood. As the IPA explained, 
‘Indigenous Australians already have a voice to Parliament’—they can vote in the federal Parliament 
like every other citizen (Institute of Public Affairs 2017). Most recently, in announcing the government’s 
decision to reject the Referendum Council recommendations, Prime Minister Turnbull echoed the IPA 
research brief. Turnbull explained that ‘our democracy is built on the foundation of all Australian 
citizens having equal civic rights’, and that a constitutionally enshrined Indigenous representative 
(advisory) body would ‘undermine the universal principles of unity, equality and “one person one vote”’ 
(Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 2017). 
 
At the core of these statements is an understanding of Australian citizenship that denies Indigenous 
peoplehood. Such denial is a political strategy that aims to relegate First Nations aspirations and 
demands to that of a minority ethnic or cultural group (Watson 2015, 2-3; Moreton-Robinson 2007, 98-
99; Barker 2005, 16). This strategy robs First Nations of the normative grounds for distinctive 
institutions, for if Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are merely Australian citizens, albeit ones 
with a particular connection to land and culture, a key component of the justification for institutional 
reform is lost. Rather, constitutional reform would unfairly ‘establish the Aboriginal people as a 
favoured class of Australians entitled to pursue advantageous claims not available to others’ (Maley 
2014). As meaningful structural reform is in part premised on Indigenous peoplehood, understandings 
of the normative dimension of Australian citizenship must be reconceptualised in order to provide a firm 
foundation for institutional change. The following section sketches some initial thoughts on this project.  
 
B. Towards an Inclusive Australian Citizenship 
 
In contrast to previous generations, legal and normative accounts of Australian citizenship are inclusive 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The terms of that inclusion, however, continue to be 
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framed by the settler-state, as dominant understandings of Australian identity and citizenship operate to 
deny Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoplehood. To some degree, this is unsurprising. Most 
accounts of citizenship are obliquely based on cultural or national identity. As such, notwithstanding 
changing demographics and migration patterns, ‘race’ remains an implicit component of the liberal 
image of citizenship (Connolly 2000, 183), often operating as a ‘pretext for imposing the majority 
nationality upon minority communities’ (Keating 2001, 9). If lasting structural reform to the exercise 
and distribution of public power in Australia is to be achieved, Australian citizenship must be 
reconceptualised such that it can recognise and accommodate Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoplehood. This understanding of citizenship would be both formally and substantively inclusive.  
 
In recent years, the idea of citizenship as ‘shared fate’, rather than shared identity, has emerged as a way 
to ground this plural and inclusive view of citizenship between and within multiple peoples or normative 
communities. Scholars exploring this concept have addressed it from diverse perspectives, but all are 
engaged in examining how democracies can meaningfully reckon with the politics of recognition 
(Taylor in Gutmann 1994, 25; Honneth 1995; Fraser 1997). There is, however, an important distinction 
between these two approaches.  
 
Recognition politics can defend and justify departures from difference-blind treatment, providing the 
conceptual impetus to acknowledge distinct Indigenous rights. As Nancy Fraser has argued, the central 
injustice of misrecognition, of ignoring Indigenous difference, is that it denies Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples ‘the status of full partners’ in Australian society (Fraser in Fraser and Honneth 
2003, 29). However, while Fraser’s account of recognition sees transformation of the politico-legal 
framework that generates those inequalities as a necessary remedy (Fraser 1997, 24), many Indigenous 
theorists argue that ‘recognition’ inherently positions the state above marginalised groups whom must 
wait to be ‘accorded’ recognition, and is therefore unable to alter, ‘let alone transcend’ structural 
inequities (Coulthard 2014, 31; Alfred 2009a). For this reason, it does not serve as an appropriate 
mechanism to build an inclusive Australian citizenship. In contrast, while citizenship as shared fate 
emerges from the same impetus of recognition politics, it avoids these complications. As this section 
will illustrate, citizenship as shared fate displaces the primacy of existing—unequal—arrangements by 
deprivileging the dominant community.  
 
Sigal Ben-Porath is a political theorist who focuses on the philosophy and politics of civics and 
education reform. In exploring this contested terrain, Ben-Porath explicitly eschews citizenship as 
shared identity, preferring, instead, to reconceptualise citizenship as shared fate for a more realistic way 
forward in liberal democracies. Ben Porath’s approach provides conceptual and practical ‘space’ for 
minority groups, who’s ‘sense of personal identification…is sometimes stronger than national 
affiliation’, to maintain and develop (with some state support) their own identities (2012, 387), while 
encouraging their participation in the construction of the national community (2006, 30). Ben-Porath’s 
citizenship as shared-fate takes Indigenous aspirations seriously, recognising that the state should 
empower Indigenous peoples to maintain and develop their own forms of belonging. However, her 
approach contains some problematic elements for Indigenous peoples, as her focus is squarely on 
building civic nationalism. Indeed, Ben-Porath’s defence of subnational groups appears tied to 
toleration, rather than flowing from intrinsic understandings of peoplehood. While I agree that the state 
has an obligation ‘to educate members about their shared fate and about ways in which they can respond 
to it and shape it’ (Ben-Porath 2012, 387), it is important not to elide asymmetrical histories of exclusion, 
domination and annihilation. This all-too-recent history is a salient fact for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people. A citizenship as shared fate that emphasises democratic patriotism (Ben-Porath 2012, 
392), cannot help but privilege existing politico-legal structures—an arrangement that Indigenous 
peoples have strong claims to critique. Developing democratic citizenship from the ‘fact of enduring 
pluralism’ (Ben-Porath 2013, 90) is a positive step, but it must be sensitive to Indigenous peoples’ 
normative distinctiveness.  
 
Melissa Williams’ account of citizenship as shared fate is more attuned to the situation of Indigenous 
peoples and thus offers firmer potential to ground citizenship in a plurinational community. Working 
within contemporary democratic theory, Williams has explored the relationship between citizenship and 
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Indigenous identity in several works (2003, 2014). Broadly speaking, Williams seeks to rehabilitate a 
‘pragmatic or functional account of citizenship’ that is stripped from associations of ‘historical 
institutions and practices’ (2003, 227). In distilling the concept of citizenship to its fundamental ideal, 
Williams understands it as imbued with the democratic notion of ‘agency’, or influence and control, 
over the ‘political structures that shape our lives’ (2014, 104). But what are these structures? In some 
respects Williams’ answer is contingent on existing political arrangements, as she identifies interlinked 
‘webs of relationship’, voluntarily assented to or not, as grounding the community joined by a shared 
fate (2003, 229) There is a risk that this approach may prioritise those existing arrangements that operate 
to marginalise Indigenous peoplehood, but Williams is careful to explain that her conception, ‘does not 
presuppose that any particular community is the privileged or exclusive site of citizenship’ (2003, 232). 
In this way, Williams argues that settler-states should constitute three analytically distinct normative 
and legal spaces, providing exclusive room for Indigenous self-government, non-Indigenous 
institutions, and a domain of shared jurisdictions and ethical concerns, that delineates the boundaries of 
the other two spaces (2014, 108).  
 
In forcing us to question why our existing politico-legal arrangements so vastly privilege the non-
Indigenous domain, Williams pushes the onus of justification from Indigenous to non-Indigenous 
individuals. The burden of justification is also addressed in Siobhan Harty and Michael Murphy’s 
defence of multinational citizenship (2005, 3; see also Ivison 2016, 16). Harty and Murphy begin by 
accepting the existence and normative force of substate nations and construct a defence of citizenship 
that accepts this reality. Their multinational model of citizenship accepts that ‘there can be multiple 
sources of legally sanctioned political power that exist in parallel, concurrent or overlapping forms that 
correspond with different territories within a state’s borders’ (2005, 13), and is thus able to ‘respond to 
the continuing resilience of national identities and the normative claims which are made on their behalf’ 
(2005, 79). While accepting the reality of a multiplicity of normative political communities challenges 
traditional accounts of sovereignty, it rests (in part) on democratic theory and equality. It demands that 
each party ‘recognise the other as a distinct people and polity, equal in status and in stature, and each 
with the right to determine freely their own futures and to be governed by their own traditions, priorities 
and institutions’ (2005, 87). Similarly to Williams, Harty and Murphy envisage analytically distinct 
normative and legal domains, including a common framework of shared-rule that governs relations 
between equal peoples. This ‘common framework’ serves as the scaffold upon which a common identity 
hangs.  
 
Seyla Benhabib does not explore citizenship as shared fate, but her discussion of deliberative democracy 
and ‘multicultural dilemmas’ helps to illuminate how a common framework could be constructed. 
Benhabib envisages diverse cultural groups engaged in ‘free and reasoned deliberation’ as ‘moral and 
political equals’ (2002, 105). If we understand Benhabib’s cultural groups as (perhaps overlapping) 
normative political communities, as contested and negotiated sites of citizenship construction, we can 
imagine multiple citizen-groups reaching agreement on a common framework with which to ground 
their broader association. The open and deliberative process is critical, because it displaces settler-state 
forms of identity that recognition politics can take for granted. Indeed, the very point of a common 
framework is to recognise that Indigenous peoples ‘have their own ways of life that deserve protection 
rather than recurrent repression’ (Hendrix 2008, 561). That framework must therefore be ‘developed 
within a shared political community…that takes account of Indigenous and settler claims, and takes both 
these claims seriously’ (Sanderson 2011, 179). Taking both claims seriously requires treating 
Indigenous worldviews, laws and practices as worthy of respect (Patton 2005, 257) and accommodating 
‘Aboriginal voices on their own terms’ (Turner 2006, 95; Tully 2005, 213-4). 
 
These accounts are useful to articulate a conception of citizenship that moves away from its traditional 
focus on national or cultural identity, but it is not clear whether citizenship as shared fate is strong 
enough to ground and maintain a common civic identity to prevent these distinct normative communities 
falling into civil strife. Indeed, citizenship as shared fate still has work to do. Like all forms of 
citizenship, it must be rigid enough to articulate and reflect some minimum set of expectations, values, 
and behaviours that comprise the civic identity of each citizen within each political community. 
Citizenship as shared fate must therefore still rest on something like a Rawlsian overlapping consensus 
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whereby ‘the public agreement on questions of political and social justice supports ties of civic 
friendship and secures the bonds of association’ (Rawls 1999, 327). The value of citizenship as shared 
fate, however, comes from its flexibility. Consistent with its de-privileging of the settler-state, those 
shared political values should be agreed to via a process of negotiation between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous polities, rather than values imposed on Indigenous peoples who are all-too-often simply 
included in ongoing settler-state projects.  
 
This is necessarily abstract, for negotiation will reveal the values that underlie such association (Tully 
1995, 7), but one consideration is worth noting.  While the core features of Benhabib’s deliberative 
model could be attractive to Indigenous peoples, many scholars have questioned whether it is possible 
in practice (for discussion see Hobbs 2017, 368-372). Putting to one side very real disparities in 
negotiation power, can common values be found? In particular, considerable debate exists over the 
extent to which liberal societies can or should tolerate illiberal communities (see e.g. Kymlicka 1995, 
ch 7). Could illiberal practices preclude the possibility of common values binding disparate political 
communities? Certainly, this conception of citizenship decentres settler-state values—values that either 
may be wrongly assumed to be common or are hardly liberal themselves—potentially leading to conflict. 
In the case of Indigenous peoples, however, this tension may be more imagined than real. The UNDRIP 
carries within it important language connecting Indigenous rights to global human rights standards. In 
particular, Article 34 provides that Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, maintain and develop 
their culture ‘in accordance with international human rights standards’, clarifying that Indigenous 
peoples already ‘walk in two worlds’ (Referendum Council 2017, i). 
 
III. CITIZENSHIP AND TREATY 
 
Framing a plural and substantively inclusive Australian citizenship on shared fate may appear ambitious, 
but it could be accomplished via a process of treaty making between First Nations and Australian 
governments. Treaties are an appropriate mechanism to develop this new conception of Australian 
citizenship, as treaties inherently concern relationships between peoples. In articulating these 
relationships, treaties tell a story about the interaction between different normative communities that 
share the land, and the values and responsibilities that secure the bonds of association between and 
among those communities.  
 
Over the years, many agreements have been reached between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples and state and federal governments, but no treaty has ever been recognised. Treaties are a distinct 
form of agreement that must satisfy three conditions (Hobbs and Williams forthcoming; Brennan et al 
2005, 3-11; Mansell 2016, 99-102). First, a treaty recognises Indigenous peoples as a polity, distinctive 
from other citizens of the state, based on their status as prior self-governing communities. Second, a 
treaty is reached by a fair process of negotiation conducted in good faith and in a manner respectful of 
each participant’s standing as a polity. Third, a treaty recognises or establishes concrete outcomes, 
including some form of decision-making and control that amounts to at least a limited form of self-
government. Treaties between the State and Indigenous peoples are therefore distinct from legal 
contracts; rather, they are ‘constitutional accords’ that ‘articulate basic terms and conditions of social 
co-existence’ and ‘establish the constitutional parameters of state power’ (Macklem 2017, 12). 
Indigenous nations enter into treaties ‘as keepers of a certain place’ (Henderson 1997, 46), and their 
settlement constitutes ‘a form of political recognition and a measure of the consensual distribution of 
powers’ (Barsh and Henderson 1980, 270).  
 
In distributing sovereignty, treaties acknowledge Indigenous peoplehood and recognise or establish 
mechanisms for self-rule. In substance then, treaties can lead to institutional reform necessary to 
empower Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to ‘take a rightful place in [their] own country’ 
(Referendum Council 2017). But treaties also do far more than this. In their relational aspect, treaties 
can ground the political culture necessary to build the moral bonds that bind citizenship as shared fate, 
by accommodating the diverse needs of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. For James Tully, 
through treaties, multiple peoples come together in a ‘mediated peace’ settled in accord with the five 
conventions of justice; mutual recognition, intercultural negotiation, mutual respect, sharing, and mutual 
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responsibility (1995, 29-30; 2008, 239). Through this process—a process akin to Benhabib’s 
deliberative dialogues—shared political values are uncovered and a new political association that 
accommodates diversity is agreed to.  
 
Historic treaties between First Nations and European states understood this, and articulate analytically 
distinct normative and legal spaces underneath a shared framework of common values and interaction. 
For instance, the Gus-Wen-Tah, or Two-Row Wampum Treaty, signed in 1613 by representatives of the 
Five Nations of the Haudenosaunee and representatives of the Dutch government in what is now upstate 
New York consists of two rows of purples shells embedded in a sea of white beads. Haudenosaunee 
scholars explain that the parallel purple shells symbolise two distinct polities, while situating them 
within a sea of white indicates a shared future based on interdependence and mutual respect (Alfred 
2009a, 76). While western states largely honoured these treaties in the breach, those shared political 
values remain key, and contemporary scholarship involves recovering and implementing these 
principles in both historic and modern treaties (Borrows and Coyle 2017). 
 
Although no treaties were signed at contact in Australia, similar visual metaphors exist. The Yolŋu 
people of East Arnhem Land illustrate the coming together of two distinct knowledge systems through 
the concept of ganma. Ganma is a coastal lagoon within the mangroves in which two streams of water 
flow and meet: one stream is tidal and salt from the sea; the other is fresh from rain on the land. As the 
streams enter the lagoon, there is ebb and flow as the water circulates silently underneath, catalysing a 
chaotic froth of foam on the surface. Eventually, the swelling and retreating of the tides establishes a 
recognisable pattern as the streams merge within the lagoon. But within this brackish water the separate 
identity of the streams is not entirely lost. Underneath the surface the streams continue to exist, 
complementing, interacting and relating to one another, but never losing their distinctiveness as separate 
and opposed parts of the whole (see Marika 2015, 187-8; Yunupingu 1994, 8-9).  
 
Treaties may offer a path to developing an inclusive understanding of Australian citizenship, but it is 
important to be realistic. First, historic treaties signed between First Nations and European states may 
legitimate the status and aspirations of those Indigenous nations who signed the agreements, but their 
terms generally betray an assimilative rationale designed to subsume Indigenous peoples within non-
Indigenous governance systems (Alfred 2009b, 46). Second, the resurgence of treaty-making in Canada, 
especially under the British Columbia Treaty Process, suggests that contemporary treaties also may not 
always respect the status of Indigenous nationhood. Many scholars have criticised these agreements as 
subverting Indigenous claims and translating Indigenous communities into municipalities with limited 
authority (Alfred 2001; Tully 2000; Barker, Rollo and Lowman 2017, 158). If treaties are to establish a 
grounds for citizenship based on shared fate, the state must not foreclose certain outcomes but must 
enter into negotiations in a spirit of equal partnership, based on ‘mutual recognition, mutual respect, 
sharing, and mutual responsibility’ (Patton 2014, 250). Nonetheless, even if in practice contemporary 
treaties sometimes fail to meet this standard, for many First Nations who have signed them, they are a 
medium through which, in the words of Edward Allen, CEO of the Nisga’a Lisims Government, ‘we 
have negotiated our way into Canada, to be full and equal participants of Canadian society’ (Allen 2004, 
234).  
 
It is all the more important to reflect on these potential pitfalls because in recent months, the prospect 
of treaties between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and Australian governments has been 
reinvigorated. Victoria and South Australia have established working groups and committed funding to 
consultative forums around the state as a first step at ascertaining Indigenous views and interests, while 
the Northern Territory government and Tasmanian opposition have both promised to drive public 
discussions on treaties (Hobbs and Williams forthcoming). Similarly, at the First Nations Constitutional 
Convention at Uluru in May 2017, around 250 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander delegates called on 
the Commonwealth to establish a Makarrata Commission. Makarrata is a Yolŋu word meaning ‘a 
coming together after a struggle’, and the delegates explained that it ‘captures our aspirations for a fair 
and truthful relationship with the people of Australia’ (Referendum Council 2017, i). Although the 
government rejected the Referendum Council recommendations, it remains open to an agreement-
10 
 
making process (Scullion in Walhquist 2017), and in any case, developments at the state level continue 
to move forward.  
 
Of most significance is the 2015 settlement between Western Australia and the Noongar people. This 
agreement is the largest and most comprehensive to settle Aboriginal interests in land in Australian 
history, involving approximately 30,000 Noongar people and covering around 200,000 km². Totalling 
about $1.3 billion, the treaty includes agreements on rights, obligations and opportunities relating to 
land, resources, governance, finance and cultural heritage. In exchange for this package, the Noongar 
have agreed to surrender all current and future claims relating to historical and contemporary 
dispossession (Western Australia 2017). The Noongar Treaty recognises the Noongar as both traditional 
owners of the land and as a distinct polity, differentiated from other Western Australians, and establishes 
and resources institutions and structures of culturally appropriate governance and means of decision-
making and control that amount to at least a limited form of self-government.  
 
The Noongar Treaty recreates some of the problems of contemporary Canadian treaties. This is most 
clearly seen in relation to its limited self-rule; there is no Noongar government and the people are not 
entitled to pass legislation. As Australia’s first treaty this is understandable, and it is hoped that the 
settlement will ‘pave the way’ for more ‘robust forms of Indigenous jurisdiction’ (Lino 2017, 131) into 
the future. This may indeed be possible. Upon notification that the Noongar had voted to accept the 
settlement, Premier Barnett issued a press release, declaring that the agreement provides the Noongar 
‘with a real opportunity for independence’ (Barnett 2015). Glen Kelly, CEO of the South West Land 
and Sea Council and Noongar lead negotiator, agrees, arguing that the treaty ‘will have a massive and 
revitalising effect on Noongar people and culture’ (Diss 2015).   
 
Ultimately, however, while the content of the Noongar treaty is valuable, the stories that it tells are more 
important, as they have the potential to imbue a new understanding of Australian citizenship. As part of 
the agreement, the Western Australian Parliament enacted the Noongar (Koorah, Nitja, Boordahwan) 
(Past, Present, Future) Recognition Act 2016 (WA). The first piece of legislation in Western Australia 
to include the Noongar language, the Act recognises the Noongar people as the traditional owners and 
occupiers of South West Western Australia, and their continued cultural, spiritual, familial and social 
relationship with country (preamble, and s 5). In the second reading speech, the Minister for Aboriginal 
Affairs, Peter Collier, acknowledged the deep injustices that had been done to the Noongar people since 
the British arrival in 1826, but noted that despite this ‘history of oppression and marginalisation’, the 
‘Noongar people have survived’ and continue ‘to assert their rights and identity’ (Hansard 2016, 1496-
7). This is critical, for, as Nicole Roughan has explained, treaties are ‘fundamentally about citizenship 
– not of a homogenized Nation-State, but of a multinational state where differentiated political 
communities must work out their ongoing interactions’ (2005, 294). Through the Noongar Treaty, new 




Australian citizenship in its legal and normative dimensions is broad enough to encompass Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islanders. The terms of that inclusion, however, largely deny their peoplehood status, 
inhibiting our ability to make institutional and structural changes to Australia’s governance framework. 
Meaningful institutional reform requires a new understanding of Australian citizenship, an 
understanding that makes room for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as co-sovereigns on 
and of this land. Treaties are the ideal mechanism through which this new understanding can be 
developed. An intercultural dialogue that takes seriously distinctive worldviews and recognises 
Indigenous peoples as equal participants in the design of a shared future, may deepen and enrich our 
citizenship, instilling a ‘plural and inclusive view of national identity’ (Parekh 2000, 236). Further, in 
establishing mechanisms of self-rule, treaties can ground the institutional reform necessary to empower 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders in our shared country.  
 
Treaties also tell stories. Understood in this way, treaties are a process of ‘belated state-building’ (Daes 
1993, 9), whereby the political and legal foundations of the nation are legitimated, and a new form of 
11 
 
citizenship and identity is constituted. Treaties provide a language for citizens within and across diverse 
political communities to converse, to articulate common aspirations and values that are embedded in a 
shared history and expressed in shared institutions (Webber 1994, 192-3). In the Uluru Statement from 
the Heart, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders drew on the importance of sharing to invite non-
Indigenous Australians ‘to walk with us in a movement of the Australian people for a better future’ 
(Referendum Council 2017, i). This partnership of sharing ‘must begin with sharing of political power’ 
(Mansell 2016, 5). Although the government rejected the recommendations of the Referendum Council, 
the Noongar Treaty, and similar developments across Australia, suggests that many Australians are 
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